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In this paper we study the impact of a temporary lack of credibility
in a transition to price stability. We quantify the e¤ects of a period of
disin‡ation on temporary output losses, and the impact of the lack of
credibility on the optimal speed of disin‡ation. We also demonstrate that
the “disin‡ationary booms” found by Ball (1994) and King and Wollman
(1999) disappear in an environment with imperfect credibility.
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In this paper we study the e¤ects of a disin‡ationary monetary policy when
policy makers are committed to price stability in the strict sense of achieving and
maintaining a constant price-level. The analysis takes place in an environment
where the supply-side of the economy is characterised by monopolistically
competitive …rms, and where there is rigidity in the setting of prices. Recent
research has revealed much about the e¤ects of monetary contraction in such an
environment.
For our purpose, three broad results stand out from this recent work. First, in
the periods following a contraction in the money stock, real output is likely to fall
below its (now altered) long-run equilibrium level. Second, a gradual disin‡ation
may actually result in output, after its initial decline, rising above its new steady-
state level, and remaining so for some time. And …nally, it is optimal to end
high in‡ations quickly, low in‡ations gradually, and maintain in‡ation at or near
zero, thereafter. The key papers that develop these results are due to Ball (1994),
Ireland (1997), King and Wollman (1999) and Khan, King and Wollman (2002).
Important precursors to the analytical foundations of these results are contained
in Danziger (1988), Benabou and Konieczny (1994) and Lucas and Stokey (1983),
while the contributions of Sargent (1982) and Gordon (1982), as emphasized by
Ireland, provide an important focus on policy implications of di¤erential speeds
of disin‡ation.
The theoretical papers just mentioned, and many others besides, assume
perfect foresight (or rational expectations). For some purposes this assumption
is obviously appropriate: what other assumption makes sense when one wishes to
calculate the optimal in‡ation rate in, or in the neighborhood of, an unchanging
steady state? However, the assumption of perfect foresight may be less attractive
2whenonewishes tocharacterise thepathof outputina transitionto pricestability,
particularly if the initial in‡ation rate is high. Policymakers may also end up
conducting inappropriate monetary policy (disin‡ating too quickly, perhaps) if
they fail to recognise that their policies may not enjoy complete credibility. In
this paper, therefore, we extend the above lines of enquiry to the case where
monetary policymakers do not enjoy complete credibility initially. We model the
monetary policymakers as doggedly pursuing the goal of price stability in the face
of this imperfect, but improving, credibility.
Two important recent contributions address some of the issues we do. The
…rst is Ball (1995). He demonstrates that if credibility is su¢ciently low, a period
of disin‡ation may lead to expected output losses. In his model agents harbour
a nagging suspicion that the authorities will renege and give up on the path of
disin‡ation. He models agents scepticism as a constant conditional probability of
reneging. This may be a somewhat rigid way of modelling the evolution of agents’
priors. On the one hand, as the disin‡ation proceeds it is plausible that agents
accord increasing weight to the announced path for the money supply. On the
other hand, perhaps as the disin‡ation proceeds and the extent of nominal rigidity
in the economy optimally rises, the authorities may be more likely to renege (to
exploit a ‡attening of the Phillips curve). We argue below that both these cases
are intuitively plausible, and so we propose an ‘expectations updating rule’ that
nests these alternatives. In addition, Ball (1995) leaves to one side the issue of
the optimal speed of disin‡ation, a topic we take up here.
The second related paper is by Ireland (1995). He also …nds that higher
output losses are the price of imperfect credibility during a period of disin‡ation.
However, the attainment of price stability is desirable (i.e., welfare enhancing) in
general, except when the loss of seigniorage is replaced in the low in‡ation state
by a rise in other distortionary taxes. Again, his modelling of the expectations
3formation process misses the e¤ects to which we have just referred. In addition,
we examine the issue of a lack of credibility in a more complex, but now standard,
supply-side with a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers. This
set up leads to some computational complexities related to the optimal choice of
prices by …rms who not only have to forecast future demand and cost conditions,
but also have to forecast their covariances. This may be why these other authors
focus on somewhat simpler supply-sides in their set-ups. We also extend Ireland’s
(1997) calculation of the optimal speed of disin‡ation to the case of imperfect
credibility, and enquire whether or not imperfect credibility materially impacts
on the optimal speed of disin‡ation, as compared to the situation under perfect
foresight. This is a question of …rst-order policy importance but which, to our
knowledge, has not been addressed hitherto in the class of models employed here,
and which are proving popular for policy-oriented analyses.
1.1. Outline of the Paper
In the next section we outline our model and discuss its salient features. In
section 3 we display some benchmark results that demonstrate the three key
points we mentioned above. In section 4 we propose our expectations updating
rule. In section 5 we analyze the impact of imperfect credibility during a period of
disin‡ation. In Section 6 we conclude and o¤er some thoughts on areas for future
research.
2. The Model
2.1. The Representative Agent
Our basic framework extends the perfect foresight model of Ireland (1997).
Its component parts are now familiar in the literature and so we can develop
the key equations somewhat briskly. The economy consist of many identical
4consumers. Each period a representative agent makes plans for consumption
and leisure/labour such that (expected) present discounted value of utility is













®;° > 0; (2.1)
and is separable consumption, Ct, and labour supply, Nt. ¯ 2 (0;1) is a discount










b > 0; (2.2)
where ct(i) denotes, in equilibrium, the number of units of each good i from …rm i
that the representative agent consumes. b is the price elasticity of demand. pt(i)
is the nominal price at which …rm i must sell output on demand during time t.














where nt(i) denotes the quantity of labour supplied by the household to each …rm
i, at the nominal wage Wt, during each period. This assumption means that
households e¤ectively supply a portion of labour to all …rms. The reason why we
need such an assumption (and the one below regarding the representative agent’s
share portfolio) is to ensure that the marginal utility of wealth equalizes across
agents.




[Qt(i)st¡1(i) +©t(i)]di +WtNt ¸
Z 1
0
[pt (i)ct(i) + Qt(i)st(i)]di: (2.4)
Here Qt(i) denotes the nominal price of a share in …rm i, st denotes the quantity
of shares, ©t (i)di = Dtst, where Dt is the dividend associated with a unit share,
and
R 1
0 pt (i)ct(i)di = PtCt denotes aggregate nominal expenditure. We assume
that for t = 0; s¡1(i) = 1; for all i 2 [0;1]: In e¤ect, then, we are assuming that
each household owns an equal share of all the …rms for each good i: The constraint
(2.4) saysthat eachperiod(and, underuncertainty, in eachstate ofnature)income
(…nancial plus labour) can be worth no less then the value of expenditure (on
non-durable consumption plus …nancial investment). The household problem,
then, is to choose ct(i);nt(i);st(i) and ‘aggregate’ consumption, Ct; such as to
maximize (2.1) subject tothe sequenceof constraints (2.4), and therelevant initial
conditions. Optimal household behaviour is described by the requirement that
household consumptionspendingmust be optimally allocatedacross di¤erentiated
goods at each point in time (i.e., the optimal ct(i)). It can be shown that the







As in Ireland (1997) it will simplify things somewhat if we let aggregate nominal




Pt (i)ct(i)di = PtCt: (2.6)
An interior optimum for the agent’s problem will include (2.4) with equality, (2.5)
for all i, and the following conditions:
C¡®
t = ¸tPt; (2.7)
6° = ¸tWt: (2.8)
And for all i
Qt(i) = Dt(i) +Et¯(¸t+1=¸t)Qt+1(i); (2.9)
where ¸t is an unknown multiplier.
2.2. The Corporate Sector
There is a continuum of …rms indexed by i over the unit interval, each of them
producing a di¤erent, perishable consumption good. So, goods may also be
indexed by i 2 [0;1); where …rm i produces good i.
Each …rm i sells shares, at the beginning of each period t, at the nominal
price Qt(i), and pays, at the end of the period, the nominal dividend Dt(i). The
representative household trades the number of shares that it owns, st(i), ineachof
the …rms, at the end of each period t. Under market clearing, st(i) = 1;8i 2 [0;1];
in each period. Firms are able to change prices each period, subject to a …xed
cost. As a consequence, in equilibrium …rms will not necessarily be willing to
change prices in each period. The criterion for the price-setting decision at time
t is to maximize the return to shareholders.
At time t we assume that …rms are divided into two categories, such that
…rms from the …rst category can freely change their prices, p1;t(i), while the …rms
belonging to the second must sell output at the same price set a period before,
p2;t(i) = p2;t¡1(i); unless they pay the …xed cost k > 0, measured in terms of
labour. We may think of this cost as being associated with information collection
and decision making. At time t+1, the roles are reversed and the …rst set of …rms
keep prices unchanged, p1;t+1(i) = p1;t(i) unless they are willing to pay the …xed
cost k while the second set of …rms, can freely set new prices.
7The model assumes, then, that …rms are constantly re-evaluating their pricing
strategy, weighing the bene…ts of holding prices …xed versus the alternative of
changing prices and incurring the …xed penalty. However at moment t the …rms
belongingto the set of…rms that canfreely change price are abletochoose between
two strategies, depending on whether the in‡ation rate is moderate or high. At
more moderate rates of in‡ation, they are more likely to keep their prices constant
for two periods and hence avoid the cost k (single price strategy). On the other
hand, in the case of a high in‡ation, to avoid the larger costs of price rigidity,
…rms choose a new price and pay the cost k (two price strategy).
We assume a simple linear production technology yt(i) = lt(i), where yt(i) and
lt(i) are output of …rm i and the labour used to produce it, respectively. Let us
denote aggregate out output as Yt; then equilibrium pro…ts at time t for …rm i are
given by,















While, in equilibrium, the units of labour supplied to each …rm at nominal wage












1; if the …rm pays the cost of price adjustment k at moment t;
0; if the …rm does not pays the cost k at moment t:
2.3. Single price strategy
Under this strategy …rm i chooses pt(i) so as to maximize the expected present
value of its pro…t:
8¦(i)t = Dt(i) + ¯EtDt+1(i): (2.11)
It is straightforward to show that the price of …rm i that will be used for two



















This equationis familiar from theNewKeynesian economics. Itbasically saysthat
the optimal price will be a function of current and future anticipated demand and
costs conditions, and where in steady state price will be a …xed mark-up over
marginal costs. As is familiar in models of monopolistic competition based on
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the markup is constant anddetermined by the elasticity
of demand (that is, tied down via the preference side of the model), the lower the
elasticity, the higher the mark-up.
2.4. Two price strategy
In this case, the …rm needs to maximize the pro…t for each period, so it needs to
choose the price pt(i) to maximise pro…ts in each period
¦t = Dt(i): (2.13)









Here we see that prices are a mark-up as before, only nowit is only current period
demand and cost conditions that are relevant.
93. Some Benchmark Results Under Perfect Foresight
The parameterization of the model is relegated to an appendix.
We study the e¤ect ofa monetary policy thatbrings money growth tozero over
some horizon. This was the approach adopted in Ireland (1997), following Ball
(1994). Speci…cally, at period 0, the authorities make a surprise announcement





s=0; such that by time period T
in‡ation will be zero. The superscript A indicates the ‘announced’ level of the
money supply. This announced path for the money supply, in turn, implies a
gradual decrease in the growth rate of the money supply. Let µt denote the growth
rate of the money stock at time t. We study, then, processes for the money growth
rate of the following sort:




for any value of t from 0 to T ¡1;where µ¡1 is equal to the initial rate of in‡ation,
and where µt > T = 1. So, a horizon of time T = 1 entails immediate disin‡ation,
while for T > 1 the policymakers engineer a more gradual path towards price
stability.
Figure 3.1 shows the e¤ect of an immediate disin‡ation on output when the
initial in‡ation rate is 3% (the dashed line) and when the initial rate is 200%
(the solid line, which is coincident with the x-axis). We see that at relatively low
rates of in‡ation, disin‡ation is quite costly as …rms follow a single-price strategy.
The ‘hump-shaped’ response is due to the fact that the …rst set of …rms to set
new prices increase their price as they face a relatively large increase in demand
for their products (since the …rms that don’t re-price have relatively high prices
and hence relatively low demand). At higher rates of initial in‡ation, …rms re-
price every period (two-price strategy) and hence disin‡ation can proceed with no
relative-price distortion.










































Annual Inflation Rate 3%
Annual Inflation Rate 200%
Figure 3.1:
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the e¤ects of a gradual disin‡ation from 3% and
200% respectively. After the initial drop in output, a gradual disin‡ation leads
to a boom in output–a relatively prolonged period of above-equilibrium output.
Agents set prices for two periods, and because in‡ation will be lower in the future,
they set lower prices today, causing a boom. At high initial rates of in‡ation, the
loss in output in the initial periods is substantial. The problem is that with
gradual disin‡ation from high rates of in‡ation, …rms do not initially change their
prices.
Finally, …gure 3.4 shows the optimal speed of disin‡ation for initial in‡ation
rates of between 1% and 20%. During big in‡ations …rms are more likely to follow
a two price strategy and hence under perfect foresight disin‡ation is costless. On
the other hand, at relatively low rates …rms are more likely to followa single-price
strategy and rapid disin‡ation is more likely to be costly.
11Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Perfect Foresight. 








































Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Perfect Foresight. 
























































In this section we consider what might happen when credibility is imperfect, but
nevertheless improving through time. In other words we run variants of the above
experiments in an environment where the probability mass characterising agents’
subjective expectations is shifting through time onto the central bank’s announced
money supply path. Again the policy employed is to lower money growth linearly
to zero over some time horizon, T ¸ 1. To retain computational manageability,
we assume that agents perceive of only two possible outcomes. One outcome
is the monetary authority’s announced path for the money supply. The other
outcome is a reversion to an alternative, more in‡ationary, path for the money
supply. There are two obvious choices for this alternative path: First, agents
perceive the authorities as reverting to the previous steady state in‡ation rate.
Second, alternatively, they fear the government will ‘run out of steam’ such that
at time t (for 0 < t < T) the growth rate of the money stock will be equal to the
13growthrate between t¡1 and t. Algebraically, we can characterize these alternate
expectations as follows:
Et+j¡1Mt+j = ½t+jµ¡1Mt+j¡1+ (1 ¡½t+j)MA
t+j; (4.1)
Et+j¡1Mt+j = ½t+jµt¡1Mt+j¡1+ (1 ¡½t+j)M
A
t+j: (4.2)
We will assume that the authorities stick to the announced path of disin‡ation,













s=0 we need to decide on ½0, a measure of the initial level of
credibility, the time it takes until ½T+J = 0, for J ¸ 0, and the path of ½s in the
transition between these extrema. One option is simply to let ½s converge linearly
to zero in the following way:
½t = ½t¡1 ¡ ®
½0
N
t ¸ 1; (4.3)
where N the is period of the disin‡ation (measured in half-years) and ® 2 (0;1).
® captures the time it takes for agents to believe completely the central bank’s
announcements–i.e., for a perfect foresight equilibrium to obtain. Let ¿ denote





However, there may be more plausible characterizations1. The following function
is useful for capturing such paths:
1This linear path for ½ leads to results intermediate between those when ½ is concave and
those when it is convex. The results showing this are available on request.
14½t = (¡1)
±k(a































Given ½0, (4.5) plots the path f½sg
T
s=0 as a concave function. This captures
the intuitive idea that agents may be reluctant to update their priors initially.
However, as time goes by and the central bank sticks to its announced money
supply targets, they increasingly come to believe the announced target path. We
shall refer to this case as concave (expectations)updating. Onthe other hand, (4.6)
re‡ects a population who although happy to accept that the monetary authority
dislikes the current relatively high rate of in‡ation worries that as the slope of
the short-run Phillips curve ‡attens, the monetary authority may be tempted
to renege. The importance of the exploitability of the Phillips curve has been
recognized by Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) and is a crucial argument in the
high in‡ation equilibria in games of the Barro and Gordon (1983) sort.3 We refer
to this as convex (expectations) updating.
2It can be shown that a = N and k = N=½0.
3Intermediate cases are possible to imagine, such as a truncated bell-shaped path for ½.
This would capture a situation in which agents initially place little weight on the authority’s
announcements, as in (4.5). However, after some time (characterised by an in‡exion in the path
of ½), agents once again become more sceptical, as in (4.6). We ignore these alternate paths.
15We still have two di¢cult questions to answer. First, what is a reasonable
value for ½0, and at what point T do we have that ½s¸T = 0;8s; how credible is
the authority’s announcement at date zero, and how long does it take for agents
to ‘arrive’ at perfect foresight? We know of no studies that we can easily draw on
to parameterize functions (4.5) and (4.6), so our approach has been to analyze the
outcome of various thought experiments under many di¤erent parameterizations
and to present the results we believe to be robust. We assume that ½0 = 1 in the
rest of this paper.4 Finally, we assume that ½T = 0 after three years. That is,
agents …nally believe the announcements when, and only when, price stability is
actually achieved.5.
5. The E¤ect of Imperfect Credibility
5.1. Concave Expectations Updating
Inevitably, the impact of imperfect credibility is to make disin‡ations more costly;
the path of output to its new steady state di¤ers from the path under perfect
foresight, and the optimal speed of disin‡ation is likely to be more gradual for
any initial in‡ation rate. And that cost seems likely to be more pronounced under
concave updating as agents adjust initially only slowly to the announced new
path for the money supply. In all of the charts that follow we assume that perfect
foresight is attained in three years. The dashed line is the perfect foresight case,
and the solid line is the imperfect credibility case. Figure 5.1 compares the path
of output under perfect foresight and concave expectations updating, given an
initial in‡ation rate of 3%.
4We experimented with a number of di¤erent initial values for ½0. The results presented were
virtually unchanged for values of ½0 as low as 0:5.
5Permitting ½ to attain zero in a shorter period does not change our results much. If ½ takes
a longer time to reach zero, output obviously also takes a longer time to reach its new steady
state level.
16Output Effects of Immediate Disinflation under Concave Learning. 








































The contraction in output is more pronounced and more protracted under
imperfect credibility. And even though by period 6 agents in both economies have
the same information, the e¤ects of imperfect credibility remain for some time
due to the overlapping nature of price setting.
One of the potentially counterfactual implications of the perfect foresight case
was the implication of the ‘disin‡ationary boom’: i.e., the tendency for output
to rise above its new steady state level under a gradual disin‡ation as agents
anticipate lower future price-levels.
Figure 5.2 shows that under imperfect credibility this e¤ect vanishes as output
falls more sharply and does not rise above its new steady state value along the
transition path. Agents only gradually come to realise that the price-level is
to grow at a zero rate–a realization that is all the more tardy because of the
gradualness of the disin‡ationary process itself. For very high initial in‡ation
rates, the fall in output following an immediate disin‡ation is catastrophic as
17Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation over 3 Years under Concave Learning. 













































…gure 5.3 demonstrates and it is also of a similar order of magnitude under a
more gradual disin‡ation, as …gure 5.4 shows.
Given the extra cost imposed by imperfect credibility, what is the quantitative
impact on the optimal speed of disin‡ation? Figure 5.5 reveals that a good ‘rule-
of-thumb’ is that disin‡ations from initial rates between 2%-11% should take an
extra year, as compared with the perfect foresight case. In contrast for in‡ation
rates above 12% and less than or equal to 1% the optimal speed of disin‡ation is
indistinguishable from the perfect foresight case.
The key reason that gradual disin‡ations are attractive is that, with some
price stickiness and under perfect foresight, they often imply prolonged periods
of above trend output and consumption. However, as the initial in‡ation rate
rises the contraction in output in the early periods of the disin‡ation is more
pronounced, increasingly o¤setting the utility gain from the subsequent boom–
the optimal speed of disin‡ation rises.
18Output Effects of Immediate Disinflation under Concave Learning. 










































Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Concave Learning. 





























































Under imperfect credibility, the initial contraction in output is more severe for
any initial in‡ation rate than is the case under perfect foresight. Furthermore, the
utility gain from the disin‡ationary boom is absent as the disin‡ationary boom
now no longer occurs. It turns out that a more gradual period of disin‡ation is
optimal up until an initial in‡ation rate of around 12%. For initial in‡ation rates
greater than 12% the optimal speed of disin‡ation is the same as under perfect
foresight.
In short, therefore, under perfect foresight gradual disin‡ations are primarily
about reaping the utility from output gains following an initial contraction in
activity, while under imperfect credibility they are primarily aimed at avoiding
over sharp contractions in activity in the early period of the disin‡ation. In this
sense, the optimal speed of disin‡ation is crucially di¤erent as between perfect
foresight and imperfect credibility.
20Output Effects of Immediate Disinflation under Convex Learning. 














































5.2. Convex Expectations Updating
Many of the same qualitative results found under concave updating are present
with convex updating. However, as is apparent from Figures 5.6-5.9, the outturns
look closer to the case of perfect foresight compared with concave updating. The
reason for this is that the convex path of ½ means that agents avoid some of
the more costly mistakes early on in the disin‡ation that occur under concave
updating. Figures 5.6-5.9 show the e¤ects of disin‡ation policies as above only
now under the assumption of convex updating.
Figure 5.6 shows that the drop in output under immediate disin‡ation leads
to a drop in output more severe than, but close to, that under perfect foresight.
This tendency for agents to believe the authorities when they announce
decreases in the rate of growth of money also permits disin‡ationary booms to
occur, as …gure 5.7 shows, for ‘moderate’ rates of in‡ation whilst such booms are
absent for higher initial rates of in‡ation, as …gure 5.8 demonstrates.
21Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Covex Learning. 










































The optmal speed of disin‡ation is closer to the case of perfect foresight than
under concave expectations updating.
22Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Convex Learning. 
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26Appendix: Parameterization of the model
The parametrization of the model, follows Ireland (1997). He follows the
parametrization derived by Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) for the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution ® = 0:1 and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) for b = 6,
corresponding to a benchmark value of 1:2 for the steady-state markup. Due to
Ball and Mankiw (1994) study, each interval of time in the model corresponds to
a period of six months, determining as well the choice of ¯ = 0:97, consistent with
an annual discount rate of 5 percent. k; the in‡ation rate for which the rigidity of
individual goods vanish, …rms switching form the single price strategy to the two
price strategy, is chosen at the value of 0.1075. The values of the parameters used
by Ireland (1997) and implicitly in this model, ®;¯;b;k;correspond to the most
acute case of disin‡ation. In our case, we assumed ° = 1:
27